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IS U.S. PREPARED TO LIVE IN A CHANGED WORLD?

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S announcement on Christmas Eve that General Eisenhower had been appointed to lead the invasion of Europe from the north and west has given new impetus to public speculation concerning the time and place of invasion, the period that must ensue before the United Nations can achieve victory over Germany, and the cost victory will entail. The President himself, and several of his closest associates have expressed serious concern regarding what they consider the dangerous over-optimism prevailing in this country. To offset this trend, it was anonymously indicated from high sources in Washington on December 22 that the nation must steel itself for heavy losses of lives—possibly 500,000—in the course of the next few months.

LEADERS ENCOURAGE OPTIMISM. It is unquestionably true that fighting men and travelers returning from the various battlefronts find the American people disturbingly light-hearted as compared with peoples in other continents who have endured war for between four and twelve years. In all fairness, however, it should be said that such optimism as does exist about an early termination of the war in Europe is due, first of all, to the confident predictions of our political and military leaders. When General Eisenhower, referring to the European theatre of war, declares flatly that "we shall win in 1944" it is too much to expect that the man and woman in the street should act, contrary to such expert opinion, as if the war might go on in Europe until 1945 or 1946. The mere intimation that victory may be within our grasp—great as its cost is bound to prove—inevitably has the effect of turning the minds of civilians, and even soldiers, to the manifold problems of reconversion and readjustment to peacetime conditions. And, as these problems are weighed, it is equally inevitable that some of the fundamental controversies over social and economic issues latent in

this country long before the war should again come to the fore. In the United States, as in Britain, and even in lands still under Nazi occupation, many people fear that, as war pressures are relaxed, there will develop an almost irresistible tendency on the part of some groups to return to pre-war conditions, and that the promises of reform held out to human beings everywhere as the guerdon of victory will remain unfulfilled. General Eisenhower did warn that, to achieve victory in Europe in 1944, it will be necessary "for every man and woman, all the way from the front line to the remotest hamlet" of Britain and the United States "to do his or her full duty." But there might be a greater surge of enthusiasm on our home front, where the goad of immediate danger is absent, if it were felt more uniformly that victory would be not merely the end of war, but the beginning of an equally forceful struggle against the social and economic maladjustments that, in our time, have bred war and revolution.

GAP BETWEEN U.S. AND EUROPE. It is, of course, true that we in this country have suffered relatively so little from the war that it is sometimes well-nigh impossible for us to imagine the agony of others. The conquered peoples of the continent, and to a lesser extent the British, have lived through such cruel hours, have had to rethink so many basic issues of life and death, that they are further away from us today than if we and they were living in different periods of history. Their wartime suffering may prove—one must hope it will prove—their post-war salvation. For, shorn of all illusion, forced to draw strength from the only values tyranny cannot destroy, they may have greater courage than ourselves in facing the problems of post-war reconstruction. Here, our present safety promises to be our future danger. It may well happen that, when the war is over, Europe, and Britain too, will seem to us to have passed through a revolution we have not shared—not merely

a political and economic change, but a spiritual revolution. We shall then be faced with the choice of either accepting the new values they have forged in the midst of war and resistance, or rejecting them—and perhaps becoming, in the eyes of the world, a citadel of conservatism, even reaction.

There are, obviously, certain experiences we have no occasion to undergo. We have no reason for trudging, scantily clad, through icy wastes, as Russian civilians—old men, women and children—did when they fled from the German invaders; or seeking precarious refuge in mountain fastnesses, as the Yugoslav Partisans, in their hegira revealed last week by the *New York Times*, were forced to do before they could strike at the enemy; or seeing our children starve, as in China, or killed by bombs, as in Rotterdam and London. But the fact remains that many Americans in our armed forces will have gone through similar or worse experiences before the war is over—and that to them the safety and relative plenty in which we live may seem as remote and strange as to the conquered peoples of Europe. To the extent that we can narrow the gap which now separates us from our fighting men, as well as from the peoples of other United Nations, we shall be not only strengthening ourselves for the blows that are to come. We shall be making an investment in the reconstruction which we, in common, with others now fighting on our side, must undertake once war is over.

When hostilities cease, the United Nations, as well as the Axis countries, will have to resume life under conditions that may have been altered beyond recognition. Such change will prove most difficult for those who were fortunate enough to know something of the stability and security which, in some countries at least, characterized the pre-1914 period. But, as the British economist Geoffrey Crowther has pointed out, those born since 1900 have never known anything but insecurity. They have seen so many values devalued, so many flags hauled down, so many institutions shaken or destroyed that, whatever else they may be, they cannot be traditionalists. The generation now coming to power all over the world has one thing in common: a fearlessness born of having outlived fear. Many of them, having lost practically all that the individual wants to possess—family, friends, property—may prove capable of rising above mere personal considerations. These, for better or worse, will be the leaders of the post-war period. We in this country must take heed not to be frightened off by such new leaders simply because they do not conform to the mental picture we have of Europe as it was before 1939. We, too, although we have lost so much less, must be prepared to embody our ideas about a better world after the war not merely in fine phrases, but in concrete acts of collaboration with the new forces emerging out of the holocaust.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

OCCUPIED COUNTRIES WANT AID—NOT TUTELAGE—FROM ALLIES

When President Roosevelt declared in his Christmas Eve address that "the rights of each nation to freedom must be measured by the willingness of that nation to fight for freedom," he gave his answer to a question that is assuming paramount importance in our relations with Europe: What role will the underground resistance groups and the armies of liberation in the occupied countries play in the Allied invasion of the continent? In his statement the President encouraged the peoples of Europe to be active participants in the forthcoming struggle and not merely passive observers of what will undoubtedly be a long and bitter fight between the Allied and German armies. Recent experience in Italy, where most of the people have stood by while the Allies have been inching up the peninsula, has given rise to the view that the liberated countries cannot be depended on to supplement the invading forces' efforts against the Nazis. Italy, however, cannot be regarded as typical of the occupied countries. Not only had it been a full-fledged partner of Nazi Germany but also, for an entire generation, its Fascist régime had wiped out local initiative and curbed the development of political leadership.

ALLIES IN YUGOSLAVIA AND FRANCE. The

belief that a distinction exists between Italy and Nazi-occupied countries is also borne out by recent reliable reports of the rise of large-scale resistance groups. In Yugoslavia, according to trustworthy witnesses, 250,000 men and women now belong to Marshal Tito's Partisan movement—a force that, in relation to population, would be comparable to two million in the United States. The part these Yugoslav Partisans will play in the liberation of their country is, moreover, no longer simply a matter of speculation, for they already control large stretches of their national territory, coordinate their assaults on German communications and strongholds with Allied air attacks, and make use of Anglo-American supplies and military advisers.

In France, as in Yugoslavia, evidence is accumulating that, when the long-awaited Anglo-American invasion is launched, it will not encounter inert masses. The French Committee of National Liberation in Algiers has repeatedly asserted that the forces of resistance at home are ready not only to fight but also to control their own affairs as soon as the Nazis are expelled. Speaking on behalf of the resistance movement, the Committee has argued that the AMG—which has been training some of its men to handle

French affairs—should not be established in France, because that country, being one of the United Nations, deserves to be treated differently from the Axis. As an alternative to AMG the Committee proposed on December 18 its own plan for setting up a temporary post-invasion régime in France. According to this plan, municipal elections would be held as soon as approximately half of France is liberated, and the local councils so chosen would select delegates to a provisional national assembly. This assembly would, in turn, name the chief of the provisional government, who would then form a cabinet of representative men, selected both from among those who stayed in France and from refugees in Algiers and London. According to this proposal, the provisional government would function until the return from Germany of millions of prisoners of war and war-workers made possible the holding of a regular national election.

A SOUND ANGLO-AMERICAN POLICY. From these facts, which indicate that the occupied countries are determined to play an active role in their own liberation and reconstruction, there follow certain corollaries which Britain and the United States would do well to note as their armies perfect plans for invading Europe. Chief among these is the consideration that it is not possible for the Allies to create the forces of liberation within occupied countries according to their own specifications. This fact has been somewhat belatedly and as yet incompletely acknowledged by Britain and the United States in the case of Yugoslavia. There the Allies have been obliged to concede that the government-in-exile they had dealt with as the official Yugoslav authority since 1941 is powerless to control events at home, whereas the new Partisan group, which came into existence without Allied blessing, is assuming dominant power. When, therefore, Marshal Tito demanded on December 22 that the Allies acknowledge his régime in-

stead of King Peter's cabinet in Cairo, he was asking for recognition of an authority that already has its own army, police, cabinet, civil service, postal system, etc. At the same time, the French Committee has also extended its influence by bringing all organized anti-Nazi forces within France under its control. To be sure, neither the Yugoslav Partisans nor the French resistance movement comprises all the anti-Nazis in their respective countries, but the important point is that they do include those daring and active individuals who can give the most valuable aid to the Allied invasion armies.

Judging from the strength of the Yugoslav and French resistance groups which have sprung up almost in spite of the Anglo-American attitude toward them, the future of these liberated countries will be largely in their hands. Since these organizations have been welded together not only by the presence of a foreign invader on the soil of their homelands, but also by the determination that pre-war conditions shall not be restored, it may be expected that their leaders will insist on far-reaching post-war reforms. Under these circumstances, any attempt on the part of Britain and the United States to restore the pre-war political and social order would encounter active opposition from the liberated nations. If workable future relations are to be developed between Britain and the United States on the one hand, and the liberated European countries on the other, it is essential that the invading powers treat the post-war goals of the resistance movements with sympathy and understanding.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

Lessons of My Life, by The Rt. Hon. Lord Vansittart. New York, Knopf, 1943. \$3.00

With "Vansittartism" a foremost subject of debate, this collection of essays is a timely and brilliantly written exposition of the view that the German menace is not Nazism but Militarism, which can be overcome only by a process of reeducation controlled by the United Nations.

Henry Ponsonby—Queen Victoria's Private Secretary, by Sir A. Ponsonby. New York, Macmillan, 1943. \$3.75

Collected letters of and to a little-known but very important official—a study in patience and tact.

Men of Maryknoll, by James Keller and Meyer Berger. New York, Scribner, 1943. \$2.00

Stories of missionaries trained at Maryknoll-on-the-Hudson and what befell them in the far places of the earth. The tale of the siege of Hongkong is particularly moving.

The Land of the Great Image, by Maurice Collis. New York, Knopf, 1943. \$3.00

Story of a Portuguese friar in 17th century Arakan, deftly raising and discussing numerous moral and political questions of the most timely interest.

What effect will the United States attitude toward the tariff, shipping, rubber, foreign lending and lend-lease have in influencing Britain's post-war trade policy? READ—

BRITAIN'S POST-WAR TRADE AND WORLD ECONOMY

by Howard P. Whidden, Jr.


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Washington News Letter



DEC. 27.—The revolution of December 20 which forced General Enrique Peñaranda del Castillo from the Presidency of Bolivia and brought to power Major Gualberto Villarroel, has confronted the State Department with an embarrassing dilemma. The problem is to decide, on the basis of available evidence, whether Peñaranda's ouster was inspired by sinister Nazi or Argentine elements who took advantage of internal unrest for their own ends, or by a genuine revolt against the social repressions of his régime, which had already provoked several crises.

It is too early as yet to assert that the National Revolutionary Movement, which under the leadership of Victor Estenssoro—recently back from a visit to Argentina—carried out the coup, is liberal or illiberal. What is undeniable is that Bolivia had long been ripe for political violence. The miserable working and living conditions of the tin miners, the country's most important industrial workers, had encouraged the activities of extremist elements, both fascist and communist. Moreover, Bolivia, like many other countries of Latin America, is readily influenced by attacks against foreign capital—and, since a large part of the foreign capital invested in the tin mines is either British or American, such attacks, even without Nazi inspiration, easily take the form of criticism of Britain and the United States.

The State Department's embarrassment over the revolt is due in considerable part to the fact that the United States government had displayed friendship for Peñaranda—who visited this country in May at the invitation of President Roosevelt—and had shown confidence that his home policies, frequently criticized in Bolivia, would not endanger his régime. It was Peñaranda who took Bolivia into the war on the United Nations' side and kept supplies of Bolivian tin moving northward to the smelter at Texas City, Texas, after Far Eastern tin sources had fallen into Japanese hands.

CLIMAX TO YEAR OF TROUBLE. Acute dissatisfaction with Peñaranda, who was inaugurated on April 12, 1940, was aroused among some groups of the Bolivian population by the massacre of Catavi on December 21, 1942, when soldiers, at the orders of the government, fired at a crowd of 8,000 striking miners, killing 19. A Bolivian-American Commission, set up soon afterwards under the chairmanship of Justice Calvert Magruder of the Federal Circuit Court in Boston, investigated the conditions of these miners and found a low wage-scale and an absence of elementary safety precautions.

On December 27 Secretary of State Hull said that recognition of the Villarroel government would be withheld until the countries of the Western Hemisphere could determine whether the revolt had been inspired by Axis sympathizers. Peñaranda, who fled to Arica, Chile, has already stated that the revolution was organized and carried out by Nazis. According to Carlos Montenegro, new Minister of Agriculture, the revolution was "popular" and "democratic" and looked "toward better living conditions in the country through improvement of economic and social conditions and the establishment of justice." However, Americans have noted that the revolt was headed by a group of army leaders who, in recent years, had expressed vigorous anti-Semitic and anti-democratic views, and are therefore taking with a grain of salt the new government's official professions of support for the "common man."

OTHER CAUSES BEHIND REVOLT. While the controversy over conditions in the tin mines may have been an immediate cause of the Bolivian revolt, at least two other factors deserve consideration. First of all, the Villarroel régime lost no time in making a bid to nationalist sentiment by reiterating Bolivia's historic claim to a land corridor to the Pacific Ocean across the territory of Chile. The assertion of this claim in the midst of a global war in which all of the countries of Latin America with the notable exception of Argentina are in one way or another engaged, injects a dangerous element into Western Hemisphere relations, threatening to precipitate a territorial conflict. Second, Argentina has not only a political but also an economic interest in Bolivia, which it may attempt to strengthen at this time with the aid of the new government. It will be recalled that when the pro-Nazi government of Germán Busch expropriated the oil properties of the Standard Oil Company in 1937—only to find that it lacked both technicians and equipment to develop them—Argentina, which needs oil, promptly offered its assistance. The Argentines were also definitely disturbed last June when Brazil offered landlocked Bolivia free port facilities in Santos with the proposal that a new railway line be built to that port, a development which might have diverted Bolivian oil from the Argentine market. Social ideology may well be at stake in the Estenssoro revolt. But so also are the age-long objects of controversy between nations—strategic territories and raw materials.

BLAIR BOLLES

1918—TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE F.P.A.—1943